Le 20-04-2019 par B. Chalumeau -    
 

This article completes the article "About the illegality of the Aachen Treaty", published here recently, which should be referred to for further details.

1)Explanatory memorandum:

Violations of national and international law are so many and so unacceptable in the Aachen Treaty that they constitute solid foundations for abolishing it, provided that the ad hoc entities have the will to do so.



2)   Abolition for violations of French and German national law:

2.1) Violations of French national law:

• Violation of the constitutional republican principle of "People's Government, by the people and for the people" by opening the right to a mixed Franco-German Assembly to legislate on certain parts of the national territory, the source of French law thus no longer emanating totally from the sovereign people. (Violation of Article 2 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic)

• Violation of the constitutional republican principle of "People's Government, by the people and for the people" by a Franco-German Council of Ministers and by periodic declaratory meetings of the National Assembly and the Bundestag with a view to "converging the rights in force in France and Germany "to another right than the initial rights, the source of French law thus no longer emanating completely from the sovereign people. (Violation of Article 2 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic)

• Violation of the constitution by setting up structures and instruments leading to the establishment of a subject of international public law of the federal state type, uniting France and Germany, without having consulted the sovereign people (Violation of Articles 5, 53 and 89 of the Constitution).

• Violation of the republican constitutional principle of guaranteeing the independence and integrity of the national territory by the institution of cross-border Eurodistricts in which the initial French sovereignty ceases to be exercised (Violation of Article 5 of the Constitution ).

• Violation of the of the Military Code of Justice for communitarization of French nuclear and conventional weapons with a foreign state:

In peacetime, Article L2 of the Military Justice Code stipulates that:



Article 67 of the Constitution “relieves the Head of State during the exercise of his mandate from the risk of being brought before any French court or administrative authority to be required to testify or to be the subject of  an action, an act of information, instruction or prosecution” and the Constitutional Law N ° 2007-238 of February 23, 2007 having abolished the criminal responsibility of the members of the government in case of conspiracy against the security of the state initially provided for in Article 68 of the Constitution, it can not be prosecuted under the Military Code Justice in peacetime.

President Chirac, aware of what he had set in motion and anxious to preserve his successors, had surreptitiously suppressed this article which gave an essential right to the sovereign people from whom it had to be stripped.

In wartime, Article L3 of the Military Code of Justice stipulates that:



However, in accordance with Article 67 of the Constitution, the Head of State can not be brought before these courts.

In conclusion, we can see that the head of state can not be prosecuted if, as here, he communitarizes the French weapons, including nuclear weapons, with a foreign state.

This is not surprising, because jurists drafting constitution  can not imagine that it could come to the idea of a head of state to share the supreme weapons of his country with a foreign country. The primary function of any head of state is to preserve them for the exclusive use of the state he leads, being, in general, chief of the armed forces …

2.2.1) Instruments to remedy this:

Apart from the ineffective instruments of the Military Code of Justice, French constitutional law opens multiple possibilities to abolish this Treaty.

However, it turns out that the Head of State, disregarding the principles of separation of powers and independence of the Justice, by placing his close collaborators and / or members of his party and the ENA to the main key positions of the State that such as the Constitutional Council, the Court of Accounts, the Court of Cassation, the Court of Appeal, the Council of State, the National Assembly, the Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation, holds all the key parts of the State with an iron hand in a steel glove, immunizing him from any criminal offense during his term of office.

Under these conditions, although our laws permit, it is illusory to seek to abolish the Aachen Treaty by resorting to the Constitutional Council.

The proof being that, if this had been possible, as is the case in a democratic system, several referendums would have already been presented to the French people, as these provisions of the Aachen Treaty seriously undermine the exercise of national sovereignty. It was not the case. It has also been seen that this Treaty entered into force without any other form of trial since the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly it establishes, has already met in Paris on March 25, 2019.

2.2 Violation of German national law:



3) Violation of international law:

3.1) Violation of European Union rules:

•   Violation of Article 326 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by creating a distinct special economic zone, which could undermine the economic and social cohesion of the Union, constituting obstacles and discriminations against other Member States

• Violation of Articles 43 to 46 TEU and 326 to 334 TFEU for having established enhanced cooperation without the authorization of the Brussels Commission.

• Violation of the principles of the European Treaties for having put in place provisions of various kinds conducive to the use of armed force and to produce, sell and export weapons of war without the authorization of the Brussels Commission.

3.1.1) Instruments to remedy this:

These instruments exist because:

• the other Member States may refer the matter to the European Council, which brings together the Heads of State and Government of the Member States, to discuss it after referral to its President.

• the other Member States may also refer to the Council of the European Union, which brings together the ministers of the Member States to decide on the Union's legislative and budgetary acts.

The abovementioned violations of the fundamental principles of the Union by the Treaty should make it inevitable to refer the matter to the Council of the European Union, both the decisions already taken by France and Germany under the Aachen Treaty and the the Moseberg agreements are important for the other EU Member States: creation of a new European tax, immigration and asylum policy, fiscal convergence, recasting of the Economic and Monetary Union, the European Stability Mechanism, backstop, creation of a euro zone budget, communitarization of the French nuclear weapons, manufacturing and sales of weapons etc …

All these elements have a considerable impact on the exercise of the sovereignty of the other Member States of the Union. Impact so considerable that it is very singular that this Council has not already been seized.

• the other Member States can refer to the European Commission whose role is to guarantee the application of the treaties. As stated above, it is singular that in this case it did not have to decide.

• the other Member States may refer the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union whose function is to ensure the application of Union law and to decide on the compliance by the Member States of the obligations arising from the Treaties.

3.2) Violations of international law:

• Violations of the reunification treaties of the two Germanys and the Moscow Treaty authorizing the reunification of the two Germanys by instituting a treaty communitizing the French nuclear force for the eventual use and making it possible to manufacture, sell and export war weapons.

• Violations of the reunification treaties of the two Germanys and the Moscow Treaty authorizing the reunification of the two Germany by establishing a treaty allowing Germany to conceal the changes in the borders of the states which are peripheral to it through the disruptive Eurodistrics and its States that thereby lose the exercise of their sovereignty, conducive to the emergence of conflicts in these areas.

• Particularly risky and dangerous position taken by the Meseberg declaration in the case of Ukraine and Donbass, which could trigger a major conflict with Russia.

3.2.1) Instruments to remedy this:

This is the most important point with regard to the abolition of the Aachen Treaty  as the importance of the violation of the Moscow Treaty is enormous, because it can lead to an international conflict of huge importance taking into account the Franco-German provisions taken not only under the Aachen Treaty, but also under the Meseberg Declaration.

If telephone conversations and summit meetings between the British, American, Russian, German and French leaders in view of this abolition fail, the British, American and Russian leaders may bring the matter before the International Court of The Hague, where is the function of regulating the different states.

Of course, the member states of the Union such as Spain, Poland, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, Italy, Holland, Austria and Denmark whose territories can be nibbled by changes in the frontiers under the Eurodistrcts and Euroregions provided for in the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle (AEBR), can also bring the matter before the International Court of Justice.

4) Strategy:

4.1) First step to take:



This referral is of paramount importance for property, the life of the members of the Union and peace in the next 50 years in Europe.



Indeed: :

• or the Court succeeds in abolishing the Aachen Treaty and it will be understood that the German people have given up their old hegemonic inclinations, which have been pushed it in the past to two world wars. The leader of France and Germany escaping the stigma of being brought with their country before the International Court of Justice.

• or else the Court does not succeed and the whole world will understand that Germany did not give up these old hegemonic leaning demons until seeking the common use of the French nuclear force to achieve its ends.

5) Special case of Germany's access to permanent membership in the UN Security Council:

This access can only be done after the amendment of Article 23 of the UN Charter, in accordance with Articles 108 and 109 of this Charter. This may be a very delicate change considering that in addition to receiving a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly, the approval of the permanent members of the Security Council must also be obtained.




Bernard CHALUMEAU

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